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Abstract: The upsurge in piracy and the impact of recent 
environmental disasters have highlighted the need to improve 
maritime surveillance. Governmental and private initiatives have 
developed monitoring systems with improved acquisition and 
analysis capabilities. These systems rely on one major 
component, namely the detection of abnormal ship behaviour. 
This implies a detailed formalisation of expert knowledge. 
However, the quantity of data, the complexity of situations, the 
failure to take into account their spatial characteristics and the 
potential for the same scenario to be interpreted in different ways 
have proved to be significant problems. We therefore propose a 
new prototype for the analysis of abnormal ship behaviour. The 
system is based on a spatial ontology associated with a 
geographical inference engine. It automatically identifies 
suspicious vessels and associates them with probable behaviours 
defined by operational staff. 
Keywords: Spatial ontology, Maritime surveillance systems, 
Anomaly detection, Automated reasoning  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The sea is a principal vector of the global economy and the 
scene of many criminal and illegal activities. It is estimated that 
70% of cocaine is transported by sea and 82% of fish stocks are 
overfished in the Mediterranean [1]. Neither national 
authorities nor maritime experts can hope to monitor such a 
wide area, and such a large volume of maritime traffic, without 
the help of information systems. However, current systems are 
principally navigational aids that do not provide an adequate 
solution to new threats and the ingenuity of criminal 
organisations. Recent initiatives have defined the 
characteristics of new systems with improved data acquisition, 
processing and detection capabilities [2]. One of the key 
components of this architecture is the automatic identification 
of abnormal ship behaviour. Optimal identification requires the 
simultaneous assessment of many parameters, a large amount 
of data and a detailed modelling of the context [3]. 
Furthermore, it requires an understanding not only of the 
phenomenon itself but also of the many environmental 
interactions (natural or anthropogenic) inherent in the situation 
as it evolves. These interactions can be difficult to measure and 
require the integration of expert knowledge.  
This article addresses these issues and describes the 
capabilities of a prototype system for the analysis of abnormal 
ship behaviour driven by a geographical ontology [4]. 
Specifically, we focus on the spatial heuristics used by experts 
in the identification of abnormal behaviour. We describe the 
development of a behavioural model and an associated 
knowledge base, which are integrated into a reasoning engine 
that can analyse ship trajectories. An integrated mapping 
module provides a visualisation of the results. The aim of this 
ontology-based system is to improve the analysis of abnormal 
ship behaviour and thus provide maritime surveillance experts 
which the necessary information for decision-making. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses 
ongoing work into new-generation monitoring systems. It 
highlights the strengths and limitations of these systems, 
particularly the need to formalise expert knowledge. In Section 
3 we describe the ontology that was built to help in modelling 
the abnormal behaviour of vessels. Section 4 presents the 
system architecture of the prototype created from this ontology 
and discusses its strengths and limitations. Finally Section 5 
draws some overall conclusions. 
II. CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 
A. New-generation maritime systems 
Various initiatives, both governmental and in the private 
sector, have tried to define the characteristics and scope of new 
maritime surveillance systems. However, because of the 
challenges and economic sensitivity of the technologies 
involved very little documentation has been made available to 
the public. 
One of the pioneering projects in the field of maritime 
surveillance is the Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment 
Activities program (PANDA) carried out by the United States’ 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The 
goal of PANDA is the automatic detection of abnormal ship 
behaviour. However, no information about the methodologies 
used or the technologies implemented has been disclosed. In 
Europe, there have been two initiatives. The ‘SECurity system 
to protect people, goods and facilities located in critical 
MARitime area’ (SECMAR) project, carried out by Thales 
Underwater Systems aims to secure ports. This project uses 
statistical methods such as hidden Markov models to study the 
behaviour of ships. The second initiative is a series of four 
projects: Surveillance et Contrôle des Activités des Navires en 
mer (ScanMaris); Traitement et Authentification des Menaces 
et des RISques en mer (TAMARIS); Système d’Information et 
de Surveillance MARitime pour l’Identification des 
comportements Suspects (SISMARIS), and ‘Integrated System 
for Interoperable sensors & Information sources for Common 
abnormal vessel behaviour detection & Collaborative 
identification of threat’ (I2C), all carried out by a public and 
private sector consortium.  
The objective of this series of projects is to provide an end-
to-end system where capabilities range from data acquisition to 
the processing of a threat at sea. To achieve this, new methods 
have been deployed, such as surface wave radar (which extends 
the area that can be monitored), algorithms to detect abnormal 
behaviour and collaborative approaches [5]. 
B. The components of new-generation maritime systems  
These systems generally consist of four common 
components centred on three principal functions (monitoring, 
detection and analysis) [6]. The four components are: 
 Extended monitoring: these new systems must be 
capable of ensuring maritime surveillance regardless of 
the weather, time of day or night, or whether the ship is 
willing to cooperate or not. Consequently, they involve 
the deployment of fixed and mobile sensors (in 
addition to traditional Automatic Identification 
Systems and conventional radar). These sensors aim to 
improve acquisition capabilities by extending the 
surveillance zone and improving detection of small 
boats. 
 Enrichment and merging of sensor data: the 
heterogeneity of sensors means that a spatio-temporal 
correlation and aggregation of the data obtained is 
necessary. This step refines the data and reduces 
uncertainties. Once the data is merged, it is possible to 
enrich it using various information sources 
(institutional and/or private) related to vessel activity, 
maritime conditions, etc. 
 Analysis of abnormal ship behaviour: this is a key 
feature of each of the projects. It concerns deducing 
and categorising a threat on the basis of a set of rules 
established in conjunction with operational staff. The 
rules can be based on static (age and type of vessel, 
etc.) but more particularly mobile (ship kinematics, sea 
state, etc.) criteria. The spatial characteristics of a 
situation are an essential element in the detection of 
abnormal behaviour they make it possible to establish, 
whether a vessel is in a prohibited area or near a coast 
(for example). 
 Collaborative capacity: once suspicious behaviour has 
been detected and validated, the operator prepares a 
report for the competent authorities who can then 
decide whether to investigate further or initiate any 
necessary legal proceedings. Such interfaces improve 
collaborative capacity and enable better dissemination 
of information in the decision-making chain, both 
horizontally (expert to expert) and vertically (expert to 
decision-maker). 
Each of these components has been the subject of extensive 
research. We, however, are particularly interested in the 
formalisation of expert knowledge for the analysis of abnormal 
ship behaviour. 
C. Approaches to the formalisation of expert knowledge 
Abnormal ship behaviour manifests itself as unusual or 
unexpected manoeuvres, or actions which do not comply with 
laws and regulations. Typically, detection is carried out by 
operators who draw upon their domain knowledge and the 
information available to analyse the situation. However, 
various limitations have been observed [7]. First, the operator 
is constrained by their cognitive abilities and attention span. 
Second, their analysis of the situation depends on their past 
experience. Given that past experience is particular to the 
individual, the heuristics used and therefore the results may be 
different from one person to another. Finally, illegal activities 
have evolved and their detection has become more difficult. 
Decision support systems that are specific to the maritime 
surveillance domain attempt to provide a response to these 
constraints. Such systems must enable experts to detect, 
analyse and interpret abnormal situations. This necessitates the 
formalisation and categorisation of ship behaviour and there are 
currently two approaches to the issue.  
The first is data oriented. Using a large data-set and various 
statistical methods, profiles (patterns) of behaviour are created. 
The drawback of this approach is that it implies a potentially 
long learning curve and the development of algorithms specific 
to the maritime domain. These difficulties lead to a second 
approach, based on knowledge engineering.  
The knowledge engineering approach consists of encoding 
the knowledge and heuristics used by experts in an information 
system. However, encoding runs into a well-known problem in 
the field of artificial intelligence — the knowledge acquisition 
bottleneck [8] (an obstacle that was encountered in the projects 
mentioned earlier). In addition, the methodology is based on a 
series of interviews with domain experts and this fact makes it 
difficult to formalise, manage, and effectively exploit 
knowledge. Several limitations have been observed, notably: 
 Formalisation: the analysis of abnormal ship behaviour 
requires the simultaneous assessment of many 
phenomena which can interact in many different ways. 
In the current knowledge engineering approach, each 
of the abnormal behaviours is described in a document 
that specifies the conditions for triggering an alert. 
However, this format does not provide the rigour or 
semantic richness needed to fully describe a scenario. 
For example, the same concept can be used in different 
scenarios but with a different meaning, or the 
interpretation of abnormal behaviour can vary 
according to the organisation (Customs, Coast Guard, 
etc.). 
 Management: to be useful, the knowledge base must 
contain the largest possible number of scenarios. In the 
current approach it quickly becomes difficult to 
manage such a large quantity of data. It may also be the 
case that certain scenarios can only be differentiated by 
some conditions. The problem then arises of how to 
distinguish between two, a priori similar situations? 
 Operations: in current decision support systems the 
document describing the scenario does not directly 
exploit the expert’s knowledge. Instead is the 
transcription of an interview with an expert. This 
transcription can lead to the loss of data.  
These points underline the fact that current decision support 
systems for the detection and analysis of abnormal ship 
behaviour do not provide all the necessary mechanisms for 
knowledge formalisation.  
Such limitations led us to another solution — specifically, 
spatial ontologies, which are both semantically richer and have 
a greater inference capability than current technologies. This 
approach makes it possible to formalise expert knowledge and 
then integrate it into a system for the analysis of abnormal ship 
behaviour in order to provide decision support. The following 
sections describe the approach in more detail. 
III. AN ONTOLOGY-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING 
BEHAVIOR 
The representation of knowledge in a readable form is 
essential to understanding a phenomenon. Ontologies provide a 
way to achieve this.  This section briefly describes the origins 
of ontology and the shortcomings of current ontology 
languages, which do not provide a means to capture spatial 
characteristics. This section also describes a method to 
overcome these limitations. 
A. Ontology 
Although originally associated with philosophy, this paper 
approaches the concept of ontology from the perspective of 
artificial intelligence. Designed as a response to the problems 
of integrating knowledge in information systems, they became 
a key element in the automatic processing of information at the 
semantic level. Defined as “an explicit and formal specification 
of a shared conceptualization” [9] they originate in the 
challenges posed by modelling the cognitive processes of 
individuals in the implementation of expert systems. It became 
necessary to develop new formalisms able to master both 
terminology and the associated semantics. This spawned a new 
form of modelling based on abstractions that could subsume or 
be subsumed by other abstractions — and the new discipline of 
knowledge engineering.  
We have already highlighted the need to incorporate spatial 
characteristics (ships’ positions, mooring zones, etc.) into 
maritime surveillance ontologies, and although there is ongoing 
work by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)1 into the 
formalisation of a Web Ontology Language (OWL) for the 
publishing and sharing of ontologies, it does not as yet provide 
types, concepts or spatial relationships. Consequently, OWL 
cannot be used to associate a geographical location with a 
particular abstraction, nor can the topological relationships 
between entities be inferred [10]. Many previous studies have 
proposed ways to extend OWL to include this spatial 
dimension. They include the work of Hiramatsu and Reitsma 
on the integration of a spatial ontology into GIS software [11], 
Stocker and Sirin on spatial inference [12], Karmacharya et al. 
on the definition of a spatial SWRL query and rule engine [13], 
and Dia Miron et al. on the exploitation of semantic 
information using a spatial-temporal reasoner [14]. In addition 
to their technical merits, these studies demonstrate the 
feasibility and potential of implementing spatial semantics in 
ontologies.  
The integration of a spatial dimension into our ontology 
was necessary both to formalise expert knowledge and to 
provide a way to automatically analyse abnormal ship 
behaviour. The following sections describe how this was 
achieved. 
B. The knowledge base 
The first step was to formalise expert knowledge in such a 
way as that it could be exploited by an information system. For 
this, we drew upon transcripts of interviews with experts who 
specified the steps necessary to identify an alert, the various 
relevant factors and their weight in the analysis. Protégé 
software2 was used to process the information gathered. The 
result was a maritime surveillance ontology that consisted of 
around forty small classes, grouped into four principal classes 
(Figure 1): 
Figure 1.  The principal classes of the maritime surveillance ontology 
                                                          
1  http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/geo/ 
2  http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
Vessel(?vessel), 
OP_Vessel_hasVesselType(?vessel, ?vesselType), 
DP_Vessel_hasSpeed(?vessel, ?speedVessel), 
DP_Vessel_hasSpeed(?vesselType, ?speedTypeVessel), 
greaterThan(?speedTypeVessel, ?speedVessel)  
→ OP_Vessel_hasAlert(?vessel, Alert_Speed_HighSpeed)
Vessel(?vessel), 
DP_Vessel_hasPosition(?vessel, ?position),  
DP_Analysis_DataPath(Alert_Area_Restricted, ?geoData),
intersects(?geoData, ?position)  
→ OP_Vessel_hasAlert(?vessel, Alert_Area_Restricted) 
 Vessel: this class consists of all identified vessels and 
all possible vessel characteristics. These include the 
type of vessel, (fishing boat, oil tanker, etc.), its 
departure point, and its position (stored in Well-known 
text format3). Certain other characteristics are inferred 
(criticality level, potential alerts, etc.) from this data. 
 Alert: this class defines the various alerts to be 
analysed. The alert typology was defined according to 
characteristics such as weather (rough seas, strong 
winds, etc.), ship behaviour (e.g. coming to stop when 
at sea) or spatial elements (entry into a prohibited area 
or a restricted fishing area, etc.). Each alert is given a 
criticality index indicating the danger level. In the case 
of spatial alerts, two further properties were added. The 
first (hasSpatialAnalysis) described the spatial 
representation to be used. Region connection calculus 
(RCC8) was used to define the possible spatial 
representations [15]. RCC8 implements eight basic 
relations between objects, including their intersection 
(partially overlapping) or proximity (externally 
connected). The second property (hasData) defined the 
data to be used in the context of the analysis. 
 Context: the context class consists of elements that 
enrich alerts. It provides information related to the 
environment (sea state, wind speed, etc.) and makes it 
possible to more accurately categorise a situation. For 
example, the fact that a vessel stops in calm waters 
does not have the same meaning as the same 
manoeuvre in rough seas. In the first case, the vessel 
may be involved in drug trafficking while in the second 
it may be damaged. 
 Scenario: this class represents the possible 
interpretation of a situation given the number of alerts 
and contextual elements. For example, a bulk carrier 
that stops near the coastline in calm seas and good 
weather may be identified as a goods or drug 
trafficking scenario. The Scenario class draws upon 
members of the Context and Alert classes. Eventually 
we hope to be able to establish the most likely scenario 
for a particular type of vessel. 
The following example is a concrete illustration of the 
approach and demonstrates the potential of the ontology to 
describe and define a model of abnormal behaviour. 
A fishing boat leaves port in a country known to be a flag 
of convenience and rapidly makes it way to a protected fishing 
zone. It stays there some time before leaving for another port. 
This situation is modelled as follows. First, three new instances 
of the Alert class are created: a ‘high-speed’ instance, a ‘stop at 
sea’ instance and a ‘no fishing’ instance. One or more of these 
alerts are then assigned to the boat in question depending on its 
characteristics (speed, heading, etc.). Then an ‘illegal fishing’ 
scenario is added which is linked to the previously defined alert 
instances through the hasAlert attribute.  
                                                          
3  Well-known text is a text mark-up language developed by the Open 
Geospatial Consortium for representing vector geometry. 
However, to be useful in an analysis system, the ontology 
requires the addition of a rule base in order to identify and 
characterise situations. 
C. Detection rules 
We used the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) to 
represent and integrate rules into the ontology. SWRL, which is 
a combination of OWL-DL and RuleML [16], enriches the 
semantics of an ontology. Designed to support reasoning based 
on Descriptive Logic Programs (DLP) and Horn logic, SWRL 
rules take the form of an implication between an antecedent 
(body) and consequent (head). In other words, whenever the 
conditions specified in the antecedent hold, then the conditions 
specified in the consequent must also hold. Unlike OWL, 
SWRL only allows the addition of relationships or existing 
properties according to whether or not they meet the rule. In 
addition to the OWL predicates, SWRL has additional built-in 
functions (mathematical, Boolean, etc.) that extend the initial 
OWL functionality and make comparisons and calculations 
possible. We adopted the idea of the ‘built-in’ function to 
integrate spatial capabilities into our SWRL rules.  
The rule base was defined in collaboration with domain 
experts and from a review of the literature [17]. Two types of 
rules were distinguished, characterised by whether they were 
non-spatial or spatial. The first (non-spatial) rules directly 
exploited the reasoning capabilities of SWRL. For example, 
suppose the aim is to detect a ship moving at a speed that is 
excessive for its type. The request, translated into SWRL is 
shown below and reads as follows, “If a vessel (?vessel) of an 
identified type (?vesselType) has a speed (?speedVessel) 
greater than (greaterThan) the maximum speed allowed for 
that type of vessel (?speedTypeVessel), then trigger an alert 
(Alert_Speed_HighSpeed)”. 
As we have already underlined, the analysis of the 
abnormal behaviour of vessels requires an understanding of the 
spatial characteristics of the situation. Therefore, the second 
type of rule extended the traditional functions of SWRL, and 
defined new built-in spatial functions (intersects, touches, etc.). 
For example, some areas may be closed to shipping. The entry 
of a ship into such an area should automatically trigger an 
alarm. This rule is expressed in SWRL by: 
 
In this example, we record an intersection (intersects) 
between the position of the ship (?position) and geographical 
data specified in the Alert class (?geoData). If the result is 
positive, we add an object property (OP) to link the detected 
vessel and the specified alert (Alert_Area_Restricted). Clearly, 
depending on the alert to be detected, other data or spatial 
functions (touches, overlaps, etc.) may be selected. Changing 
the spatial function simply entails changing the keyword in the 
SWRL rule. Changing data involves specifying which data to 
use from the data property (DP) DP_Analysis_DataPath. 
IV. A SYSTEM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL SHIP 
BEHAVIOUR DRIVEN BY AN ONTOLOGY 
Once the ontology has been built, it is integrated into a 
system for the analysis of ship behaviour, in order to 
automatically detect abnormal activities. 
A. System architecture 
The analysis consists of five stages of information 
processing (Figure 2). First, as new sensor data arrives it is 
merged and the sensor database is updated (Step 1). The 
merged data is then fed into the ontology processing engine 
(Step 2). Next, the inference engine processes this new 
information using the predefined SWRL rules and characterises 
the behaviour of the vessel (Step 3). The result is stored in the 
detected threat ontology (Step 4) and displayed by the mapping 
module (Step 5). This section describes in detail Steps 3, 4 and 
5 which form the heart of our system. 
Figure 2.  Architecture of a system for the analysis of abnormal ship behavior 
The ontology is updated with new information arriving 
from sensors. Two types of information can be distinguished: 
static data that is not expected to change (for example a new 
model of ship in the Vessel class); and dynamic data (typically 
vessel properties such as position or velocity). Updates are 
carried out via the OWL API4  (an open-source Java library) 
which enables the creation and manipulation of ontologies.  
The ontology cannot be exploited until processed with a 
reasoning engine. The purpose of the engine is to infer new 
facts from existing data. In our case, it is used to infer a 
situation according to the position and characteristics of a 
vessel. Amongst the reasoners currently available, we decided 
to use Pellet5 . Although it is not the most efficient option 
available [18], it has very good SWRL support, it is compatible 
with OWL 2, it integrates seamlessly with the Jena 6  
framework and the OWL API, and more importantly, to the 
best of our knowledge it is the only reasoning engine that 
makes it possible to add new built-in functions [19]. The 
reasoner applies the specified SWRL rules to the ontology to 
determine whether or not a ship is behaving abnormally. 
Depending on the result of the inference, new attributes and 
new relationships are automatically added, and the ship in 
question is assigned a criticality level.  
The display module connects to the detected threat 
ontology. Once the ontology is updated, the results are 
displayed on a map interface. This enables the analysis to be 
visualised more intuitively. The information displayed can 
relate to the ship’s properties, its spatial characteristics or to a 
specified alert.  This is illustrated by the two examples shown 
in Figure 3. 
                                                          
4  http://owlapi.sourceforge.net/ 
5  http://clarkparsia.com/pellet/ 
6  http://incubator.apache.org/jena/ 
 Figure 3.  Examples of abnormal ship behavior.  
A: detection with a spatial rule. B: detection by attributed rules. 
The first case corresponds to the SWRL rule discussed in 
Section III C which describes the entry of a ship into a 
restricted zone (the area represented by the light-coloured 
polygon). The inference engine has automatically detected an 
offense based on the ship’s position, and on the DataPath 
property of the restrictedArea instance of the Alert class. On 
the basis of this information the vessel is reported as acting 
suspiciously. At the same time, the ship is automatically 
allocated a danger level based on the criticality index of the 
alert. 
In the second case, the inference engine has detected two 
non-spatial alerts; the first is related to the age of the vessel and 
the second to its speed. Both these alerts are strongly linked to 
the type of vessel (for example, the maximum speed of a 
container ship is less than that of a ferry). This case is 
interesting because it illustrates the situation where a vessel 
raises more than one alert. We have decided (for the time 
being) to define the danger level of a vessel according to the 
alert with the highest criticality index. Visually, this 
progressive increase in criticality is represented by colour 
differences. Vessels are displayed surrounded by a halo of 
yellow, orange or red to represent increasing levels of 
criticality. 
B. Strengths 
The prototype was based on a data set containing the routes 
taken by 2,200 vessels in the Mediterranean and totalled more 
than 36,000 coordinates. Consequently, one of the principal 
challenges was to provide a scalable system able to withstand 
and adapt to the high volume of data inherent in this field. 
Previous research has only used a limited number of instances 
and properties. For example, Roy and Davenport’s paper [20] 
on the development of a spatial analysis module and the 
analysis of the kinematics of vessels (KIGAM) was based on 
around a hundred recordings. Like our project, the authors 
aimed to identify suspect vessels and categorise potential 
threats. Although the volume of data they analyse is smaller, 
their ontology is (at the present time) more complete than ours.  
Our approach provides domain experts with great flexibility 
in the development of a model. Previously defined keywords 
(intersects, touches, etc.) provide the foundations of a 
topological logic. This intuitive, keyword-based method 
enables operators to take account of spatial characteristics 
when modelling scenarios. Although the method can be 
improved, we have found it to be more suitable than traditional 
Geographic Information Systems, which require specific 
training and knowledge that maritime surveillance experts do 
not necessarily have. Moreover, these systems do not have the 
same modelling capability that ontologies offer.  
C. Limitations 
Although the prototype is now functional, various areas for 
improvement are already apparent.  
At the present time, the prototype described here can 
process a database containing details of several thousand ships, 
using around a dozen simple rules, in under a minute.  
Scalability tests, which involve adding a spatial index (similar 
to that found in databases), are in progress. Initial results have 
shown significant gains in computing time.  
It would also be useful to make it easier for the operator to 
create detection rules. Currently, these are added directly in 
SWRL using the Protégé interface. This can be a difficult task 
for the person responsible for developing the model. It 
therefore seems useful to create an interface that would make it 
possible to draw these rules graphically (as described by 
Snoggle [21]). The expert could then draw a scenario that 
would be translated automatically into SWRL and integrated 
into the ontology. 
Finally, calculating the probability of a scenario has not yet 
been addressed. This step would measure the semantic 
similarity between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a 
particular vessel and the other hand, the characteristics of the 
scenario.  We are considering two approaches to calculating 
this similarity: the first is based on the informational content of 
objects (a node-based approach), and the second is edge-based 
[22]. We plan to test these two solutions in order to determine 
which offers the most relevant results. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described the development of a prototype to 
demonstrate the potential of spatial ontologies for the detection 
of abnormal ship behaviour. To achieve this it was necessary to 
extend the initial capabilities of SWRL rules in order to include 
a spatial dimension. This provides maritime experts with the 
ability to describe behaviours while at the same time ensuring 
maximum expressiveness. The ontology and the associated 
rule-base were processed by an inference engine in order to 
provide automatic scenarios corresponding to the situation in 
question. In the case of abnormal behaviour, the system 
automatically determines the criticality level and adds this 
information to the ontology. Finally, the results of the 
inferences are displayed on a map interface so that the expert 
can better analyse and understand the situation. 
The scenarios described here show the potential of our 
approach in the domain of maritime surveillance. The examples 
given show the potential of the system to analyse both spatial 
and non-spatial situations. A meeting with domain experts 
(Marine Surveillance and Rescue Centres, Coast Guard, etc.) is 
planned; this will enable us to enrich our approach, add new 
types of alerts and complete our analysis. 
Beyond the prototype described here, this article has 
highlighted the need for ontologies to take into account spatial 
characteristics. At present, there is no ontology of spatial types 
(line, point, etc.). For this reason, our prototype recorded the 
location of vessels in textual form (Well-known Text). 
However, this storage method does not exploit all the semantics 
of spatial information (spatial functions, indexes, etc.). It would 
therefore be interesting to focus further work on the definition 
and implementation of new spatial types and predicates, as is 
currently the case in databases. 
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